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"The question that has puzzled me is: How are institutional facts possible? And what exactly is the structure of such facts?"
His book may be seen as an attempt to counter Berger & Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality. He continues,
"Many people, including even a few whose opinion I respect, have argued that all of reality is somehow a human creation."
and explains what he does in his book as:
"So after attempting to answer my original question, How is a socially constructed reality possible? I want also to defend the contrast on which the question rests. I want to defend the idea that there is a reality that is totally independent of us."
His attempt at what this socially constructed reality is rests heavily on language and the lingual aspect, and in fact he seems in danger of trying to reduce everything to this aspect, and talks mainly in terms of 'facts' about things rather than things themselves. He puzzles over different kinds of fact, to try to define or characterise 'institutional facts'.
Much of what Searle says seems to point unmistakeably to Dooyeweerd's ideas around modal aspects, inter-aspectual dependency, qualifying aspects, founding aspects, and the like. I want, here, to show these similarities in Searle's thought to that of Dooyeweerd, and also discuss some differences.
According to Dooyeweerd, these are irreducible to each other. Functioning in one aspects can never be (fully) explained in terms of functioning in others. So, for example, social functioning can never be reduced to physical or biological factors. There is always something above and beyond these that is germane to social functioning.
In many places, and especially in chapter 1, John Searle takes pains to argue for some of this irreducibility. Early on he describes a simple scene, in which he goes into a restaurant for a beer. He says,
"we cannot capture the features of the description I have just given in the language of physics and chemistry. There is no physical-chemical description adequate to define 'restaurant', 'waiter', 'sentence of French', 'money', or even 'chair' and 'table', even though all restaurants, waiters, sentences of French, money, and chairs and tables are physical phemomena. Notice, furthermore, that the scene as described has a huge, invisible ontology: the waiter did not actually own the beer he gave me, but he is employed by the restaurant which owned it."
Throughout the book we find things that suggest that Searle recognises the irreducibility of various aspects. One example is on p.78, where he says "the facts in question persist through time independently of the duration of the urges and inclinations of the participants in the institution." Though his main message is about time, we can detect some tacit recognition here that the social aspect is not reducible to the sensitive aspect.
Searle's text is shot through with traces of these dependency relationships, even though he might not call it so.
In a section labelled 'Fundamental Ontology' Searle recognises that social reality is somehow distinct from other aspects of reality: "how social reality fits into our overall ontology, i.e. how the existence of social facts relates to other things that exist." But he then summarizes what, as he sees it, is the basic beliefs that humankind holds today, namely that all matter is made of atoms and that all living things have evolved to what we find today. He adds into this his beliefs about consciousness and the ability to represent things in the mind, to complete the summary ontology, and then asks "how can we account for the existence of social facts within that ontology?"
He wants to account for social reality "within" the ontology of physics and biology and psychology. These are three of Dooyeweerd's aspects: the physical, the biotic and the sensitive (as psychology). From a Dooyeweerdian point of view, we can see that there are another three aspects between those and the social, namely the analytic, formative and lingual, and shades and hints of these three come through in Searle's text at various places. It seems as though, independently of Dooyeweerd, he finds that the social aspect somehow depends upon and requires at least all the aspects from the physical to the lingual. (He gives special place to the lingual, as we discuss below.)
Furthermore, other aspects depend on the social (or, perhaps, the lingual). From a Dooyeweerdian perspective, lingual phenomena (utterances, facts) will usually be for a purpose from one of the later aspects. Searle explicitly lists (p. 124), "linguistic, economic, political, religious" - which is exactly the order that Dooyeweerd gives the later aspects (with the addition of social, aesthetic and ethical). This ordering might have been accidental on Searle's part, but the one-to-one correspondence between his list and Dooyeweerd's later aspects is notable. It does seem that Searle might have some intuitive feel for Dooyeweerd's aspects, even if not a full one.
He talks a lot about marriage, which Dooyeweerd would tie to the ethical aspect, as 'an institutional fact'. The utterances at the wedding ceremony 'create' a new institutional fact, a marriage. Similarly, "new property rights are created by speech acts" [my emphasis]. Now, Dooyeweerd would see things slightly differently:
"'War'", Searle says later on, "oscillates between naming a type of large-scale social fact and a type of institutional fact." In saying this, and the sentences that follow it, he recognises that war has both a social and a juridical aspect to it, and it seems that he is not quite sure how to account for both of them. In fact, this characterises several things he has written, and he himself seems to "oscillate between" trying to reduce things and recognising their irreducibility.
|Non-mental v. mental facts
|"Mount Everest has snow", v. "I am in pain"
|Sensitive aspect v. the pre-sensitive aspects (physical, biotic, etc.).
|Intentional v. non-intentional
|"I want a drink of water" v. "I am in pain"
|Analytical aspect v. pre-analytical, especially sensitive aspect state.
|His brief text on this, and his example, do not make the meaning clear, but it seems as if one speaks of some decision or distinction I make.
|Singular v. collective
|"I want a drink of water" v. "The hyenas are hunting a lion"
|The distinction seems unclear to me, especially as the examples differ along several dimensions. I suppose the intended one is one v. many, but that is not very helpful because what if I say "I think" v. "A million of my brain cells are active"? This is one good reason why Dooyeweerd's centring of the social aspect on 'social interaction' rather than mere 'grouping' is important. Grouping is really of the quantitative aspect rather than of the social.
|Assignment of function v. all others.
|"This is a screwdriver" v. "I want a drink of water"
|Formative aspect, especially in its tool-making form, v. pre-formative.
|Agentive v. non-agentive, also between manifest v. latent functions
|"Hammer drives in nails" v. "Heart pumps blood"
|Several differentiations here: between natural and artificial entities, between whole entity v. part (heart), between main aspect and other aspects in which an entity functions.
|I suspect that Searle himself might soon rethink this level as there seems to be several things here. The distinction between manifest and latent functions relates to the Dooyeweerdian recognition that though an artificial entity might have been created for one aspectual purpose, in fact most things are multi-aspectual in nature so it is no surprise to find other latent functions. Also, given a manifest function in one aspect, latent functions can always be found in later aspects because those aspects depend on the manifest aspect.
|Causal (casual?) function v. function based on collective acceptance
|"This is a screwdriver" v. "This is money"
|Social v. pre-social aspects
|Notice that his example of money is an economically-qualified phenomenon, and the economic aspect, being after the social, requires and depends on the social.
|Linguistic v. non-linguistic
|"This is a promise" v. "This is money"
|Entities of lingual functioning v. entities of other aspectual functioning even though they involve the lingual.
|Searle then classifies lingual entities (utterances) by their purpose which in most cases is dictated by another aspect: "linguistic, economic, political, religious". This speaks, as we mentioned above, of post-lingual qualification. He also uses a couple of other classification dimensions.
I intend to write here to explain this, but cannot provide the time just now; maybe someone else will do this. [==== 30 April 2015]
In order to advocate a distinct philosophy of society, He posed a number of questions, suggested three conceptual tools with which to address them, and suggested answers. His questions were:
Tool 1: Different classes of entities have different functions; function is a meaningfulness to the observer, and it inherently implies normativity, or at least that one thing should happen rather than another. This occurs in biology (norm of life), and onwards.
Tool 2: Collective intentionality: we cannot reduce 'we intend' to 'I intend' plus beliefs about you; there is something irreducibly social about 'we-ness'. How do we analyse collective intentionality?
Tool 3: Constitutive rules, which bring things into being, such that 'X counts as Y', X being e.g. physical and Y as the social reality.
Searle made the strong claim that agreements or impositions that 'X counts as Y' is the foundation of all institutional reality (e.g. a piece of paper issued by the bank counts as money). This leads to a sixth question,
He attempts to give a two-part answer, calling upon (a) the idea of infinite regress upwards (thus going against his earlier concern to avoid it), and (b) the idea that social structures interlock. However, while this might describe a possible mechanism for how these are powerful, it does not give a proper answer. However, an allusion to where a better answer may be found is that he recognises the fragility of such collective agreements and talks about 'acceptance', by which he means a kind of commitment.
==== more to be written.
I will show that his arguments are flawed (appealing to Heidermann 1999), and that really he is calling for meaning which is diverse. And that is well addressed by Dooyeweerd and his aspects. ===== to be written.
Searle,.J. 1998. Social Ontology and Philosophy of Society. Analyse & Kritik, 20, 143-158.
This page, 'http://www.dooy.info/ext/john.searle.html', is part of a collection of pages that links to various thinkers, within The Dooyeweerd Pages, which explain, explore and discuss Dooyeweerd's interesting philosophy. Email questions or comments would be welcome.
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Copyright (c) at all dates below Andrew Basden. But you may use this material subject to conditions.
Created: 10 July 2000. Last updated: 7 February 2001 copyright, email. 17 September 2002 moved to ext/. 17 June 2010 .nav, .end, rid unet. 5 November 2021 Refashioned page, to include more of Searle's thought, not just COSR; brought in SOPS; new .end, bgcolor, canonical;